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ABSTRACT. There are significant challenges that face Māori students and super- 
visors as a “doctoral team.” Perhaps the most fundamental of these is that there is a 
metaphysics at work in writing and talking that Māori are encouraged to speculate 
on and reclaim. One term for this metaphysics, “Papatūānuku” (often abbreviated to 
“Papa”), signifies an active entity that rejects strict definition but influences both 
doctoral text and team. This article proposes that student and supervisor must 
simultaneously glance towards the conventions of academic writing and recollect 
Papatūānuku as potential being in the doctoral process. 
 




Knowingly or not, the Māori doctoral supervisor and student are both at the 
mercy of a constellation of metaphysical entities. One of these, Papatūānuku, 
who claims both parties equally, may well provide an ethical platform which 
undergirds how things in the world may be described or thought about in a 
thesis. Papatūānuku is sometimes shortened to “Papa” in such common 
terms as “kaupapa” and “whakapapa.” “Kaupapa Māori,” in particular, is 
commonly encountered in research: it can mean “a body of knowledge” 
(Pihama, 2005, p. 191) and is often used as a method in various kinds of 
research. Whilst Papatūānuku is often reductively translated as “Mother 
Earth,” it holds more gravid implications for the researcher and the super- 
visor: it represents potential being, and requests that a writer represent things 
in the world with some uncertainty; moreover it possesses its own “mauri” 
or life-force and can – if the supervisor and student withhold from defining it 
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too restrictively – disrupt the certainty of academic text. This active nature of 
Papatūānuku in research is one discursive consequence of many, stemming 
from broad and common utterances that suggest that all things in the world 
are connected (see for instance Marsden, 1985; Pere, 1982). The dis-ordering 
nature of “Papa,” embedded as it is in terms such as “kaupapa” (commonly, 
“theme” or “purpose”) and “whakapapa” (frequently translated as “gene- 
alogy”), has the potential to destabilise a text, as long as those immersed in 
the doctoral experience commit to a speculative reflection about Papa. If 
student and supervisor choose that path, then both ethical disruption and 
creativity can occur in a thesis. 
There is thus a peculiar relationship between the researching self and 
Papatūānuku and all its derivatives. Even though Papatūānuku is energetic, 
transformative and mysterious, we are called to represent it in text by 
Papatūānuku itself, the “rock foundation beyond expanse, the infinite”  
(Marsden, 2003, p. 22). It is important, however, not to rush too quickly into 
a thetic description of what kaupapa Māori/whakapapa/Papatūānuku are, for 
this would be to constrain their potential within the thesis.1F It is moreover 
important that student and supervisor engage with another, different percep- 
tion that gives rise to a discussion of those Māori terms, as clear and highly 
present. Both student and supervisor are equally implicated in this meta- 
physical issue, even if the supervisor is conventionally thought to be more 
expert.2F Even trickier is the issue of how to overthrow that deeply en- 
trenched expectation by which every writer is anticipated as the undeniable 
namer and describer of an object. We might be tempted to revert here to the 
Māori language as an antidote to that problem, mistaking the former as 
immediately opposed to the subject/object divide; however, the Māori 
language can also be subverted, so that the self is illuminated as a central 
agent in defining and representing the object. The Māori language could 
indeed be useful as a political and epistemological tool to destabilise the 
self-assuredness of English text and of that a priori academic expectation, 
but it will be no more challenging than English unless it is wielded with the 
metaphysics of a Māori worldview in mind.  
In doctoral work, arguably the most pressing issue besets the Māori 
student and supervisor – hereafter in places called the “doctoral team” – 
immediately as they set out to attach a name or label to an object. The 
abstract as well as material consequences of naming an object, discussing it, 
placing a boundary around it through singling it out, have an impact on the 
object as well as the self. Whilst this is a concern that extends generally to 
conflicts between Māori and Western views on language, it manifests in 
doctoral work in particularly vivid ways. These include: the ways in which 
academic expectations push the Māori writer to order data, material and text; 
the general drive to ensure that the writer is consistent across terms; and the 
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much more fundamental Kantian insistence that the writer must not engage 
with the object in its entirety when representing it through language. In this 
article, I propose that the Western call for a rational and enduring grouping 
and depiction of objects runs counter to a Māori ontological view of  
language. I suggest that, to manage the rigid arrangement of language and 
object resulting from Western academic conventions, the Māori doctoral 
team needs to consider shaking the very certainty the doctoral thesis asks of 
its members.  
Throughout this article, I refer to “Papa” as one very complex term that, 
as primordial Being, demands to be honoured in its own right within the realm 
of other common research terms such as “kaupapa” and “whakapapa.”3F I 
propose that, although academic doctoral work calls for a fixity of Papa, the 
doctoral team ultimately have the option to listen to its mysterious edict and 
to ethically represent it, and other things in the world, on that basis.4F 
 
The Ethics of Speculation:  
Emphasising the Vigour of the Non-foundational Ground 
 
Most indigenous participants in ethics committees will be aware that those 
forums can only look at certain facets of proper behaviour. The focus of 
ethics committees is generally on how people are going to be affected by 
research in a very narrow sense. But ethics for a Māori doctoral team is 
somewhat askance from the institutional norm, because it asks for an account 
of a colonising representation of a phenomenon and proposes that there is a 
more appropriate one to be thought of. Ethics is indeed culturally con- 
structed (Cram & Kennedy, 2010), and most university ethics committees, 
even in Aotearoa/New Zealand, are not capable of taking into account a 
Māori speculation on what is right and what is wrong in a most general 
sense. For Māori, by comparison, ethics is as much ancestrally as socially 
constructed. That is, an ethical representation in a Māori view attempts to 
hold the full possibility of an object and its relationships with other parts of 
the world, past, present and future, and indeed with the world as a whole. 
Additionally, how one conceives another entity has repercussions on the 
wellbeing of the world, including the self, at several levels (Mika, 2015c). I 
have at the heart of my concern here the belief that, if we refer to our ideas 
and entities in the brightly clear way that I will soon describe, then we cause 
trauma to ourselves and to the world. To that extent, rationalism has set up a 
self-sustaining, replicating world of conceptual trauma for us, and the aim of 
some of us in our doctoral supervision and work is to challenge that reality. 
The question necessarily arises for the Māori researcher: How do we sabotage 
that Western machinery? 
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Any solution must begin with the knowledge that ethics is not merely to 
do with the human world. Included in the “strong holism” of a Māori world- 
view are both Māori doctoral student and supervisor, who are accountable to 
the world, beyond what can be seen or experienced. Thus a doctorate is as 
much to do with thinking about an ethical approach to, and representation of, 
a non-human phenomenon (Wildcat, 2001a – and here, “thinking” is 
crucial!) as with the pursuit of an answer to the research theme proper. These 
phenomena involve activity beyond our direct experience. As an example: I 
attended an ethics meeting some years ago, and an application came before 
us that involved a researcher photographing whakairo – carvings (among 
other things). The application was a full one in terms of dealing with people 
– it ticked all the right boxes – but as the Māori ethics committee member I 
felt bound to point out another problem altogether. The applicant had 
assumed that the whakairo were there to be photographed, that they were 
inanimate or lacking their own life. He had assumed this to such an extent 
that he did not even raise it as an issue. Of course, on an ethics committee 
such protest is problematic; it smacks of mysticism and the esoteric. Yet, I 
felt compelled to raise it because of the works of people such as Kincheloe 
& Steinberg (2008), who quite simply but profoundly maintain that every- 
thing in the world is imbued with life. I also have my own upbringing, which 
in places emphasised that interconnection quite strongly.  
Interestingly, the Committee agreed, but only to the extent that reason 
would allow. Thus the members, all of whom are seasoned academic 
researchers, would bring the value of the whakairo back to something that 
humans had constructed. In other words, the whakairo might have an essence, 
but this is due entirely to humans. This is partially correct, but it is incom- 
plete because indigenous metaphysics tends to acknowledge that there is an 
aspect to any particular thing in the world that contains its own autonomy, its 
own “living energy” (Deloria, 2001b, p. 22), regardless of how we construct 
it.  
 
My Theorising on Dominant Western Metaphysics and Research 
 
From a Māori worldview, another, prior field of thought sits behind the idea 
that things in the world lack mauri (life-force), which also holds sway 
regarding the pursuit of clarity in Western research. This most classic of 
metaphysics (Fuchs, 1976), or “first set of principles” (Deloria 2001a, p. 2), 
which started with Plato and Aristotle, runs quite contrary to our own world- 
view. There is a deep-seated expectation in the West that runs in the follow- 
ing way: an object will appear as what we expect it to appear as, and will not 
appear as anything else (Peller, 1985). Because Being for Plato was static 
and unchanging, objects, despite their changing appearances, are capable of 
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being known as objects. This a priori template precedes issues that we often 
see writers discuss, such as fragmentation of the object, privilege of humanity 
in the world, and so on (these are extremely important offshoots of that first, 
ancient metaphysics). The object, pinned down as object, is highly present to 
the self, even before it appears. The problem here is one of as-ness. The 
object is hence highly positive in its qualities as an object, and we can then 
have clear, epistemic access to it.  
There are certainly consequences in that highly expectant worldview for a 
Māori metaphysics. In theorising about a thing in the world we may, as 
students and supervisors, have to be prepared to withdraw from saying what 
that thing is. Given the obscurity that characterises Māori metaphysics, it is 
quite possible that, before colonisation, we never expected an object to 
manifest in preordained ways. It would have had its own mode of appear- 
ance. One of the problems with the predetermined appearance of an object 
that I have just outlined is that we dictate how the object is to manifest. But 
in our traditional worldview, I surmise that we had more respect for an 
object appearing in its own right, and not necessarily as any one thing but as 
an intriguing amalgam of the sublime. The metaphysics of presence has other 
ideas and poses a distinct dilemma. It arises in the comparison of common 
linguistic conventions, such as in the English verb “to be,” for which there is 
no Māori equivalent. Whilst the verb “to be” does not exist in Māori, and 
was not necessary in a Māori preservation of the sublime, it has nevertheless 
been imputed as a concept through translation. Thinking for many Māori 
therefore threatens to have been “conditioned to some extent by the structure 
of the language in which [they mostly] express or formulate [their] thoughts” 
(Kahn, 1966, p. 245). From a Māori vantage point, a problem with that verb 
could be its tendency to single out an entity on the basis of its quiddity: 
where Māori ontology wants to hint at that numinous phenomenon within 
terms, academic language instead requests a pointing to the entity in its 
utmost clarity. As we are called on to say “kaupapa Māori is this or that,” the 
ontological statement becomes different to the “overplus” (Otto, 1958, p. 5) 
that is reserved for the term “kaupapa” in its own right. We are making an 
assertion about what it is for something to be kaupapa Māori. We are also 
pinpointing Papa in that assertion; we can say exactly what Papa shall be, and 
indeed, as we have seen with the metaphysics of presence, we have appre- 
hended how Papa shall manifest – as object – even before we have turned 
our thinking to Papa.  
As a Māori doctoral team, we will in practice alternate between shades of 
obscurity (we might here call this “darkness” or “te pō”) and luminosity, but 
that foundation of perception at the very base of Western research forces us 
to keep things extremely evident. This may be one of the major theoretical 
issues that face us Māori researchers, whether we are doing philosophical 
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work or community/iwi research, where our method is more concerned with 
obtaining data of some sort. We are perhaps to a degree what Wildcat (2001b) 
refers to as “metaphysical schizophrenics” (p. 116) when he discusses the 
problem of Native scientists who sell their soul to science. The same malady 
confronts us, regardless of whether the research is scientific or community 
related. None of us can fully escape the ground of certainty that the academic 
tradition has set in place. We can perhaps destabilise it, but even in that act 
we are comporting ourselves within its bright confines. As a student, I fell 
afoul of it all the time, and supervising carries its own pitfalls, as the academic 
convention of clear, rational language asks for wholesale commitment from 
me. For my own work, I might write about the solid, certain ground in 
thought and critique where it comes from (a mixture of Plato, Aristotle, 
Descartes and Kant), and I might employ tactics, such as referring to a very 
different, poetic source in my work. However, I still end up holding the hand 
of academic tradition to a very large extent. 
The intriguing possibility that originates in our belief system, that there 
exist dimensions outside of our understanding and experience (Marsden, 
2003), shows itself in an expansive interpretation of whakapapa. The ground 
that emerges from whakapapa, and is important to Māori generally, is more 
powerful than its association with its common translation of “genealogy” 
(Mika, 2011). Here I suggest that whakapapa deals with the world on its own 
terms and can reinterpret academic dogma. In other words, when we come 
into contact with the metaphysics of presence, whakapapa dishevels it in 
some way, or clears it even temporarily. This is one creative articulation that 
gives whakapapa a mystical ability to act autonomously and imperceptibly. 
There may or may not be any evident signs of our culture in that act: the 
Māori individual who is not apparently involved in any Western endeavour 
is still claimed by that Western ground of thought, but nevertheless deals 
with it in that destabilising way. In this scenario, a Māori scientist dissipates 
the colonising field of thought simply by interacting with it, in an unconscious 
manner. The Māori lawyer does the same, as does the Māori teacher. The 
Māori researcher obscures the high presence of terms and concepts simply by 
being involved in them, by (re)conceiving of them and re-presenting them. 
All this dissipation happens despite the fact that the terms and concepts still 
appear to be commandingly present, signifying that the destructive, trauma- 
tising ground of Western thought in research reveals its vulnerability even as 
it appears to be monolithic. This idea is not an unfamiliar one to certain 
Western philosophers such as Heidegger (1977), Foucault (1990) and Derrida 
(1982), and indeed we could return to our ancient Māori idea that the phe- 
nomenon “korekore,” an overly negative metaphysical entity, cannot help but 
display its positive attributes (Marsden, 2003). Shown in our metaphysics, 
that susceptible display also occurs in everyday life. 
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Our Agency within/with Papa 
 
However, my aim is merely to hint at that tantalising prospect, and then to 
move my focus to the reality of our agency as a Māori doctoral team – to 
deliberately reclaim some aspect of the sublime Papa within our research. 
Doing Māori doctoral research, we would be unsettling certainty itself when 
we invoke kaupapa Māori as a methodical, ethical and theoretical under- 
pinning. In a Māori supervision process, hearing what students want to 
achieve, what really excites them, by asking them questions and listening to 
their responses, is a crucial start. It is remarkable that we consider whakaaro 
(thinking) as residing in the gut (Smith, 2000), so for us, thinking and feeling 
are at once the same. It therefore suits us better to acknowledge that thinking 
is due to the outside world as much as the inner. In any case, as soon as we 
have a reaction to something, we have an inclination towards it, it resonates 
with us, and that resonance stays with us even if we think we are being 
purely rational. But we cannot undermine sheer thought, either, even if it is 
constantly accompanied by feeling. In relation to language, I describe my 
process in the following way: a term claims my attention; I turn to it and get 
a feel for it in light of my experience and upbringing (and this does not 
require proficiency at any one particular language; this is more of a deep 
recess of whakapapa); and I then consider that it may be a potentially 
colonising influence. In the Māori doctoral experience, inquiring into the 
point of curiosity for all members of the team leads to a significant con- 
tribution to the thesis.  
There is, in the first instance, a full horizon of the team’s involvement 
which needs to be speculated on, although it may not be fully grasped. The 
thorough extent of an engagement with the text is underpinned by the 
presencing of Papatūānuku. Here, we see a triadic interaction involving the 
primordial ground, comprising the supervisor, the student, and thought-
within-Papatūānuku. This last, somewhat confusing, nomenclature is not 
easily rendered in dominant, rational discourse but can be roughly translated 
by the Māori term “whakaaro” (Mika, 2014). An active engagement with 
thoughts as our relations, undergirded by Papatūānuku as that which can be 
pondered but ultimately not known, calls for the team’s deliberate and 
sustained philosophising in the thesis context, as Papatūānuku is an enduring 
presence in thought. The particular issue of method – how one will 
encounter a thing in its most basic form and how one determines it will 
appear to the self (and thence how it will be grouped with other things to 
answer a research question) – is important, but the team can discuss how 
concepts can be represented holistically, and how this will dictate an 
approach to their research. The Māori doctoral team may or may not refer to 
this process as kaupapa Māori. In that act, I emphasise a ground of thinking 
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that can provoke further thought and encourage speculation down an uncon- 
strained path. As with an ethical representation of the whole, the ground of 
thought is linked in a Māori metaphysics to a primordial entity that rests 
within the term “kaupapa” – Papatūānuku. Due to the fundamentally 
unknowable nature of Papatūānuku, the Māori doctoral team is engaged in a 
similarly uncertain supervisory relationship. To that end, kaupapa Māori – if 
we identify that concept – is a free-thinking process that originates in the 
constant accrual (“whakapapa” or “layering”) of Papatūānuku to the self.  
Kaupapa Māori is hence a process of theorising rather than a constant 
theory in my link with the thesis and the student. Theorising is not necessarily 
the same as theory, and there is a very bright antithesis to the theorising 
experience I advocate that I feel compelled to discuss. What is it about the 
phrase “kaupapa Māori theory” that I have problems with? Is it in the terms? 
My fear is that “kaupapa” has become too based on a ground that is not 
beyond our experience but instead has the effect of a textbook – a ground of 
certain discourse. Has “kaupapa” taken on a complexion that was never 
anticipated by our ancestors? We can open that textbook, tick the criteria that 
it lists, and then carry on with research proper. My own reluctance to invoke 
the phrase “kaupapa Māori theory” rests in its apparently straightforward 
character, the ground of certainty that it conjures for both student and super- 
visor. Schelling (1856), the German Idealist, believed that the foundational 
was paradoxically non-foundational; we are well advised to pay heed to the 
dangers hiding in a perception of the ground of thought as a firm, complete 
one – rather than as one of infinitude.  
 
Theorising as Non-foundational Disruption 
 
Some examples are called for here to clarify what is at stake in the textural 
difference between certain and uncertain, clear and obscure. Kaupapa Māori 
theory asks both students and supervisor to declare or position their research 
in line with their whakapapa. If “whakapapa” is taken to mean “genealogy,” 
then kaupapa Māori theory, as a phenomenon of permanence, does not 
trouble the thesis text and its expectations of academic inquiry in any way. 
However, if a student is encouraged to try and write about whakapapa as 
creatively as possible, quite distant from the idea of “genealogy,” then 
problems can occur for both the student and the supervisor. Suddenly, 
whakapapa becomes anything but genealogy; it becomes something that 
threatens to shake up the text. Whakapapa, escaping from the constraint of 
what Heidegger (1971) calls “calculative thinking” (p. 420), takes on its own 
organic disruption. It might now connote a claim of the self by Papa or, as 
far as thought goes, a move toward certainty that never quite arrives there 
(Mika, 2014). In that one reconfiguration of one Māori term – and there are 
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lots that can be reconfigured – the pristine, settled linearity of academic 
convention is put on trial, because this reconfiguration opens up the frozen 
landscape of academic language to a manifestation of the uncontainable. 
Whakapapa is now no longer the straightforward “genealogy:” it is an active 
phenomenon. 
In this, we remain true to the Māori belief that language has a wairua 
(Browne, 2005). The antithesis of the metaphysics of presence, it speaks to a 
certain ontological, energetic nature that resides in a given term and that is 
affected by our interpretative approach but is not thoroughly defined by it. 
Fixed kaupapa Māori theory is disciplining but also productive in some 
instances: disciplining if the student does not theorise about the terms that 
are given in the principles, and productive if they decide to take the infallible 
definition to task and move it elsewhere. Other terms that I raise here are 
“ako” and “whakawhanaungatanga” (Smith, 2002). As with whakapapa, the 
temptation in academic research is to just represent “ako” as either “teach/ 
learn” (or both teach and learn at the same time, in line with Bishop & 
Glynn, 1999), and not to account directly for the sense of fragility that the 
self must contend with when instructed by the non-human world, evident in 
other aspects of the term’s meaning such as fragility, excitement and 
vulnerability (Thrupp & Mika, 2012). Whakawhanaungatanga, instead of 
conjoining nicely and tightly with its economic meaning of “relationship,” 
can push to the surface of the student’s writing – and indeed of the student’s 
and supervisor’s discussions – a complete otherness, posed by external 
things in the world and their persistent pull on the researching self. In both 
these instances, too, student and supervisor can either give free rein to the 
terms and the mystery that they retain to themselves, or else the established 
relational economies can constrain them.  
 
Doctoral Reflection on a Dialectic 
 
The Māori doctoral team is consistently faced with a practical decision: to 
continue on down the path that a Māori term has suddenly carved into the 
manicured turf, or to pull that term back into line – to discipline it back 
towards its given, unchallenging meaning. The difficult path actually 
consists in the representation of the sublime whilst accounting for that very 
deep ground of high presence and clarity. For me, whether it is an ethics 
committee, or lecturing, or writing, or presenting a paper in a forum, my job 
is to name the problem. When I talk about research – empirical or philo- 
sophical – I want to address the ground of Western thought and perception 
that allows research to thrive, to begin with. Even when we are making 
assertions about our own worldview, those of us working in this area, I find, 
are constantly manoeuvring backwards and forwards between critique and 
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affirmation (see, for particularly good examples of this approach, the works 
of Andreotti, Ahenakew & Cooper, 2011; Ahekanew, Andreotti, Cooper & 
Hireme, 2014). This is a method that our ancestors may have encapsulated 
with the term “wananga.” In a social context, that could mean the presence 
of both critique and affirmation. Identifying a problem and suggesting a 
solution thus go hand in hand.  
For Māori researchers, this dialectic tries to keep an entity in one piece as 
we talk about it, but draws back from foreclosing Papatūānuku by establishing 
its permanent properties. It is in that consciously resistant yet affirmative 
activity that kaupapa Māori theory becomes theorising. Alongside just giving 
Papatūānuku free rein through creatively and directly representing it, I 
attempt to engage with the doctoral experience by identifying and unsettling 
the potential constraints placed on it. In other words, how can a way be 
cleared for Papatūānuku to merge into the text of the thesis? For a Māori 
researcher, the process perhaps starts with a self-confidence concerning 
speculation itself. Māori students frequently declare their pepeha (tribal 
saying, linking with “whakapapa”) to position themselves and to assert their 
right to undertake the research. With that utterance as it stands, there is a 
snug fit with the expectations of academic writing conventions, because it 
does not actively disturb the rational nature of academic thought. But we are 
encouraged to go further than that: the Māori doctoral team is called to 
inquire into how that same pepeha also acts as an im-position on the text, 
incidentally un-positioning the idea that one’s knowledge of the pepeha is all 
that matters. The critical use of a student’s pepeha calls on one’s mountains, 
lake and so on as a deliberate saboteur: all these entities emerge and position 
themselves against the rationalism that doctoral writing privileges. They are 
not just conceptual phenomena and can accord with a view of whakapapa 
that holds within it the potential being of “Papa.” In the example of the 
pepeha, Papatūānuku is not mentioned, yet the doctoral experience asks that 
the ultimate originary ground of Papatūānuku be given space to flourish – 
even where Papatūānuku is not being held as a point of debate. Papa here is 
silently forceful when we reflect on colonisation and pose it as a problem in 
a thesis. Those of us Māori who make philosophy our central work and write 
about it have to come to terms with Derrida’s (1982) warning, for instance, 
about the apparently self-evident term, and must become intimately familiar 
with its quietly constitutive and oppositional counterpart – Western thought. 
In the doctoral exercise, the Māori doctoral team may co-construct a 
response, drawing on both Māori and appropriate Western theory, to then 
philosophise about Western colonial thought as it relates to the student and 
their text. We have to know and counter the assumptions that emanate from 




Like it or not, we have a relationship with the unyielding ground that the 
West has laid for us to research on. More than that, we are connected 
permanently to that ground. But we have other tools besides those that the 
West offers at our disposal, and it is this excess beyond the Western 
expectation that we have to consider if we are to truly get to the root of both 
philosophical colonisation and the unsettling of it in doctoral research. 
Whether innate to the terms kaupapa and whakapapa, on its own, or indeed 
left unspoken, Papa moves the supervisor and student to repeatedly transcend 
the banality of academic convention, even if those instances are just fleeting. 
It is the responsibility of both supervisor and student in the doctoral 
experience to try and hold a speculative response to the call of Papa and to 
leave aspects of the world unclear and autonomous. Conjoined with Papa in 
that brief instant, the participants in the doctorate are themselves made vul- 
nerable and ungrounded, but are simultaneously invited to ethically represent 
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